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ABSTRACT
WPA2 Enterprise is a fundamental technology for secure commu-
nication in enterprise wireless networks. A key requirement of
this technology is that WiFi-enabled devices (i.e., supplicants) be
correctly configured before connecting to the enterprise wireless
network. Supplicants that are not configured correctly may fall
prey of attacks aimed at stealing the network credentials very eas-
ily. Such credentials have an enormous value because they usually
unlock access to all enterprise services.
In this work we investigate whether users and technicians are
aware of these important and widespread risks. We conducted two
extensive analyses: a survey among approximately 1000 users about
how they configured their WiFi devices for enterprise network
access; and, a review of approximately 310 network configuration
guides made available by enterprise network administrators. The
results provide strong indications that the key requirement ofWPA2
Enterprise is violated systematically and thus can no longer be
considered realistic.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Mobile and wireless security; Au-
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works;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Secure WiFi access is a fundamental component of every enterprise.
This technology is based on the WPA2 Enterprise family of proto-
cols and ensures that only authenticated devices may connect to an
enterprise wireless network: each user has personalized credentials
and devices may connect only after presenting valid credentials
of a user [10]. After successful authentication, the wireless traffic
between the device (supplicant in WPA2 Enterprise parlance) and
the access point occurs with strong security guarantees: secrecy,
integrity and mutual authentication. The protocols for providing
these guarantees are such that devices owned by different users
need not trust each other. As such, WPA2 Enterprise provides a
strong and secure foundation for wireless communication within
any large organization.
A key requirement of WPA2 Enterprise is that supplicants be
correctly configured before connecting to the enterprise wireless
network [12]. While the exact meaning of correctly configured may
depend on the specific environment, a fundamental requirement
is that the supplicant knows in advance the DNS name of the au-
thorization server of the enterprise network, that is, of the server
that validates the credentials exhibited by a supplicant during the
authentication that must occur prior to connecting.
Satisfying this requirement is extremely important. Supplicants
that are not correctly configured, i.e., that do not know the DNS
name of the authorization server for the enterprise network, may
be easily tricked into starting an execution of the authentication
protocol with an evil twin, a malicious access point that broadcasts
the SSID of the enterprise network (e.g., [2, 7, 8, 11, 16]). In most
configurations the protocol execution will fail, because the evil twin
will not be able to authenticate itself to the supplicant as required
by WPA2 Enterprise. However, even a failed execution may suffice
to leak user credentials to the evil twin—the supplicant may decide
to abort execution when it is too late, i.e., after it has already sent
credential material to the evil twin.
This fact is not a merely hypothetical risk. It has been recently
showed in [6] that by just wandering around for a few hours in
regions not covered by a wireless network one could collect 200
enterprise credentials—roughly 25% of them in clear text and the
remaining ones in hashed MS-CHAPv2 form, which can generally
be decrypted easily [1]. It was also showed that by remaining for
a few seconds at less than 35 meters from a specific (voluntary)
target whose wifi device is not configured correctly, there is a very
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good chance that you may steal his/her enterprise credentials; even
when he/she is sitting in a car with close windows. We are thus
facing a scenario with attacks that can be done quickly, cheaply, ev-
erywhere outside of the enterprise, that do not require any explicit
action from the targeted user; attacks that deliver, if successful,
the enterprise credentials, either in the clear or in a format that
may be attacked offline with moderate effort. We emphasize that
we are not concerned with man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM), i.e.,
attacks in which the supplicant connects to the Internet through a
fraudulent access point. We are concerned with attacks consisting
in stealing network credentials by means of an execution of the
network authentication protocol: these attacks may occur in an few
seconds and without any involvement of the user, unlike MITM
attacks.
What makes this issue particularly relevant and important is
the combination of two factors: nowadays most enterprises are
based on single sign on, i.e., the same credentials that are used
for authenticating to the wireless network unlock access to all
the services of the enterprise; and, virtually everyone is equipped
with a portable WiFi device (a smartphone) that is permanently
attempting to connect to known SSIDs.
In this work we aim at gaining some insights into whether users
and technicians are really aware of these important and widespread
risks. Anecdotal evidence and our own experience suggest that
this is not the case. For this reason, we conducted two extensive
analyses: a survey among approximately 1000 users from many
different institutions about how they configured their WiFi devices
for enterprise network access; and, a review of approximately 310
network configuration guides made available by enterprise network
administrators.
The results of our analyses, illustrated in the next sections, pro-
vide important insights into the practical deployments of such a
pervasive and fundamental technology as WPA2. Perhaps most
importantly, these results show that the basic security assumption
of WPA2 Enterprise “you are expected to configure your device ap-
propriately, otherwise you will still connect to an authenticated access
point but you might be connected with an attacker” is indeed vio-
lated systematically and thus can no longer be considered realistic.
This is an extremely important point to make, because the WiFi
Alliance is defining a new generation of secure protocols for wire-
less networking (WPA3) that will address several shortcomings of
the current WPA2 standard (e.g., the recently discovered KRACK
vulnerability [13]). The publicly available information on WPA3,
though, does not address the issue of supplicant configuration at all
[5]. We are thus incurring the risk of receiving a novel fundamental
standard constructed upon requirements that in many cases are not
satisfied, thereby leading to practical deployments of the standard
that in many cases will not be secure.
2 SURVEY OF CONFIGURATION PRACTICES
In order to gain insights into how users actually configure their
wifi devices, we circulated a survey in the eduroam user commu-
nity. Eduroam is a roaming access service provided by a number of
research institutions [14]. It allows members of participating insti-
tutions to obtain Internet connectivity at any other participating
institution. In 2016, eduroam provided over 2.6 billion authentica-
tions of roaming users in the same country and over 592 million
cross-border authentications1.
Focussing on eduroam is important for several reasons.
• Each user should connect to eduroam according toWPA2 En-
terprise configuration instructions specific to his/her home
institution. Thus, the survey allowed collecting data about
the practices followed at many different organizations.
• Eduroam has developed an application available for all the
major operating systems that allows users to configure their
devices automatically, with the configuration suitable for
their home institution—eduroam-cat2. Thus, the survey al-
lowed collecting data about the actual behavior of users, i.e.,
whether they are able or willing to configure their devices
autonomously, or they resort to the tool for automatic con-
figuration. We emphasize that usage of the tool ensures a
secure configuration of the supplicant while autonomous
configuration does not.
• Eduroam is a federation of research institutions, thus their
users may be more willing to share details about their tech-
nical practices than corporate environments.
Indeed, we are not aware of any similar survey regarding the prac-
tices actually followed by users for configuring their WPA2 Enter-
prise supplicants (see also below).
The survey consisted of a few non-technical questions to be
answered on a Google Form, available in Italian and in English.
We used our personal contacts as initial seed. We collected 1099
answers, of which 964 from users which had connected at least one
of their wifi devices to eduroam. In the following we will consider
only answers from these users. We submitted several questions
separately for smartphone, tablet, notebook and obtained answers
for 2054 devices.
Users were from approximately 100 institutions in 20 countries
(specification of country and institution was optional). The distri-
bution of users across institutions is highly skewed, with only 4
institutions associated with more than 20 answers. The distribution
across countries is skewed as well, with most answers coming from
Italy or from an unspecified location, but with the Italian version
of the form; we received 193 answers from 19 countries different
from Italy and 12 answers from an unspecified country with the
English version of the form. Although the user population is obvi-
ously not a statistically significant sample of the full population, we
believe the results are indeed relevant and useful. The breakdown
of users depending on their self-described role in the respective
institution is given in Figure 1. It can be seen that the population is
not concentrated on any specific role.
The key question was “how did you configure your device for con-
necting to eduroam?”, which was formulated separately for smart-
phone, tablet and notebook. The possible answers were:
(1) “My device is automatically managed by my organization”;
(2) “I have downloaded and installed the network profile of my
organization”;
(3) “I have played with configuration options until it worked”;
1https://www.eduroam.org/2017/03/07/2016-a-record-breaking-year-for-eduroam/
2https://cat.eduroam.org/
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Figure 1: Role of users participating in the survey.
(4) “A technician of my organization has configured my device
for me”;
(5) “I don’t know”.
Mapping from these answers to the security of the resulting con-
figuration is not automatic. We considered the possibility of defin-
ing different answers that could have facilitated this mapping but
quickly rejected this option: the number of possible answers would
have been very large; the survey would have been suitable only
for skilled users; and, filling the form would have been quite cum-
bersome and time consuming. Thus, we preferred more general
answers in order to collect as many users as possible. Said this, we
believe it is reasonable to assume that:
• categories 1 and 2 correspond to a secure configuration;
• categories 3 and 4 may or may not correspond to a secure
configuration (these two categories will be analyzed in more
detail below)
The answers are summarized in Figure 2.
It can be seen that near half of the supplicants have been con-
figured with the network profile published by the respective or-
ganization. This result is certainly highly positive from the point
of view of the developers of the tool for automatic configuration
(eduroam-cat) but, in our opinion, is highly worrying: only half of
the supplicants are certainly configured securely. We believe that
this result is a very strong indication that the underlying hypothesis
in WPA2 Enterprise (i.e., that supplicants are configured correctly)
is not realistic.
Concerning category 3 “I have played with configuration options
until it worked” (35.3% of devices), we have no elements for conclu-
sively determining whether the resulting configuration was secure
or not. However, there are strong signals suggesting that for many
users this is not the case. Figure 3 summarizes the answers to the
question “do you know the name of the eduroam Authorization Server
of your organization?” given by users that have connected at least
one of their devices to eduroam. It can be seen that 76.6% of the
users either do not know that name or do not even know what an
Authorization Server is. Although knowledge of the name of the
Authorization Server is, strictly speaking, independent of the secu-
rity of the resulting configuration, it seems reasonable to assume
that if users in these categories proceed with trial and error until
Figure 2: Configuration procedure followed by users. Num-
ber of answers for each category of devices (up), percentage
of answers all categories (down).
Figure 3: Answers of users to the question "do you know the
name of the correct authorization server for your network?"
connecting, then the resulting supplicant configuration is unlikely
to be secure.
Concerning, finally, category 4 “A technician of my organization
has configured my device for me” (9.9% of devices), it would be tempt-
ing to assume that all these devices have been configured securely,
but such an assumption is probably excessively optimistic. To our
surprise, we have found several eduroam configuration guides pub-
lished on the web that suggest insecure supplicant configurations,
the most frequent insecure suggestion being “do not validate server
certificate”. Thus, either technicians at those institutions are not
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fully aware of the security risks, or choose to ignore those risks. In
either case, one cannot take for granted that a technician will con-
figure a supplicant securely. In order to gain more insights into this
important issue, we have performed a more systematic analysis and
reviewed a number of configuration guides, as explained in the next
section. Irrespective of the security of the resulting configuration,
though, the fact that less than 13% of users had the configuration
either performed by a technician or managed automatically, implies
that supplicant configuration of WiFi Enterprise networks should
be designed with unskilled users in mind.
The previous data are relative to the whole set of devices. The cor-
responding data for each of the three device categories—smartphone,
tablet, notebook—are given in Figure 4. These data provide an im-
portant insight: smartphones are proportionally much more likely
to be connected to eduroam than either tablets or notebooks—the
percentage of devices that have never been connected to eduroam
are 7.5%, 57% and 22.7%, respectively. This result confirms that
smartphones are a very attractive target for attackers, more so than
either tablets or notebooks: smartphones are more likely to contain
enterprise credentials; and, smartphones may be attacked by an
evil twin everywhere outside of the enterprise, without any need
of requiring any specific action from the user.
Another observation that can be made from Figure 4 is that the
distribution of configuration procedures for smartphones is roughly
similar to the distribution for all devices (Figure 2), more so than
in the case of either tablets or notebooks. In particular, we remark
than one third of users that connect their smartphone to eduroam
do so by playing with configuration options.
Our data confirm earlier analyses executed on a smaller and
more localized scale. An experiment in which the configuration
of 507 devices of approximately 350 users in the same University
was checked is reported in [7] (along with a more detailed analysis
of potential vulnerabilities in eduroam deployments, along with
suggestions for possible mitigations). The users were explicitly
invited to participate in an event for checking the configuration of
their devices and had to go to a room prepared for this purpose; thus,
it is fair to assume that the involved users were more technically
informed and security-savvy than the average of the entire user
population. Furthermore, the event was organized five months after
updating the eduroam configuration guide and after distributing
specific leaflets. Despite these very favorable conditions, it turned
out that 52% of the devices were wrongly configured. A report
summarizing a 4-year experience of deploying WPA2 Enterprise
in an University (not participating in eduroam) reported that 43%
of their students “do not use CA certificates to authenticate the
server” [15].
We cannot compare our results to data obtained in corporate
environments, as we could not find any such data. We are only
aware of surveys in large US companies focussing on policies for
enterprise usage of personal devices (bring your own device, BYOD):
interestingly, half of the organizations that support or mandate
usage of personal devices do not have a formal policy for their us-
age [3, 4]. Furthermore, half of the respondents to another similar
survey use their personal devices in the workplace even in organi-
zations that explicitly ban the use of those devices, or in the absence
of any specific policy or without even knowing whether such a
Figure 4: Configuration procedure followed by users, sep-
arately for each device category: smartphone (up), tablet
(middle), notebook (down).
policy exists [9]. These facts are a further proof of the relevance of
the issues that we are considering here, we believe.
3 SURVEY OF CONFIGURATION GUIDES
We reviewed 311 configuration guides published on the web by 69
institutions in 17 countries (each guide being for a specific suppli-
cant operating system). We are not aware of any similar analysis.
The institutions are a subset of the institutions found in the user
survey of the previous section (we could not afford to analyze all
the institutions). We considered only configuration guides either in
English or in Italy.
We placed each guide into a single category, depending on
whether the guide contained any indication that could lead to an
insecure supplicant configuration. The categories are as follows:
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Figure 5: Configuration guides by category.
Do not validate server certificate The guide specifies to uncheck
the “validate server certificate” option.
No validation info The guide does not provide any informa-
tion about the need to validate the certificate, nor about the
certificate itself.
Any certificate The guide specifies explicitly to accept any
certificate.
No certificate info The guide specifies that a certificate has
to be accepted, but it does not provide any indication about
the certificate itself (i.e., about which certificate should be
accepted).
Incomplete certificate info The guide shows the server name
(usually in images used for clarifying the idescription) but it
does not specify that only a certificate with that exact name
should be accepted.
None The guide does not indicate any action that could lead
to an insecure configuration.
The distribution of guides by category is shown in Figure 5. It
can be seen that only 60% of the guides belong to category None,
thus 40% of the guides contain indications that could lead to an
insecure configuration.
The risk levels of the chosen categories are different, thus one
might claim that not all the resulting configurations can be con-
sidered as being insecure. In particular, the risk level for guides in
categories “No certificate info” or “Incomplete certificate info” is
arguably smaller than for guides in the other categories. However,
even if we consider guides in those categories as suggesting a partly
secure configuration, it is simple to realize from Figure 5 that these
guides would account for just 10% of all guides: the percentage of
guides suggesting an insecure supplicant configuration would still
be around 30%.
To ascertain whether this result is an artifact of a few institu-
tions publishing many guides with questionable indications, we
counted how many institutions published only guides describing a
secure configuration. We found that only 29 institutions published
guides of this kind, while the remaining 40 institutions published
at least one guide leading to a configuration that is either insecure
or partly secure (in the meaning above). The vast majority of these
institutions (36 out of 40) published at least one insecure guide.
This result is a strong indication that, as claimed in the previous
sections, one cannot take for granted that a technicianwill configure
a supplicant securely. We believe this result is highly significant and
constitute a further proof that a fundamental security assumption in
WPA2 Enterprise—supplicants must be configured appropriately—is
no longer realistic.
Of course, by nomeans we are implying that technicians that pre-
pared the guides in our analysis are not competent. We are merely
describing the existing scenario. There may be many reasons why
a configuration guide indicates steps that could lead to an insecure
configuration, for example, the need of prioritizing the effort of the
(usually scarce) IT staff could have led to the decision of writing
configuration guides that are simpler for users to read and for tech-
nicians to maintain, even at the expense of an increased risk, in
exchange for more time to devote to other activities for increasing
the overall security of the organization. Indeed, we are aware of
several institutions of the eduroam federation that carefully config-
ured their infrastructures so that supplicants may connect only by
using the network profile installed by the eduroam-cat application
3.
Finally, we observed that 47 of the 69 institutions make a network
profile available for downloading and usage with eduroam-cat. We
could not identify any significant signal linking the possibility of
using eduroam-cat and the quality of the configuration guides.
Interestingly, we observed that those configuration guides that
mentioned eduroam-cat, tended to describe this tool as a mean
for simplifying the configuration; the fact that eduroam-cat allows
obtaining a secure configuration is mentioned much less frequently,
if at all.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Techniques for attacking WPA2 Enterprise supplicants that are not
configured appropriately are widely known (e.g., [2, 7, 8, 11, 16]).
These techniques are not a weakness of theWPA2 Enterprise family
of protocols: they are an obvious consequence of using those proto-
cols without satisfying their basic requirements. The corresponding
risks have become much more pervasive and significant than they
used to be, though, and it seems fair to claim than neither users nor
technicians have realized the magnitude of these risks. The world
is now very different from how it was when WPA2 Enterprise was
3This property is obtained by a smart exploitation of the fact that WPA2 Enterprise
protocols allow using two different identities during an execution of the authentication
protocol; these infrastructures are configured to require an outer-identity identical for
all users, hard-coded within the network profile of eduroam-cat and unlikely to be
guessed by trial and error; and an inner-identity specific for each user.
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defined, in 2004: today virtually every user carries a WiFi-enabled
personal device that attempts to connect to known networks per-
manently and automatically, without any explicit action from the
user; what is worse, such devices often connect by using credentials
that unlock access to all services of an enterprise. The combination
of these two factors makes attacks aimed at stealing enterprise
credentials from smartphones extremely attractive [6].
In this work we conducted two extensive analyses aimed at as-
sessing how pervasive the corresponding risks are. A survey among
approximately 1000 users from many different institutions and a
review of approximately 310 network configuration guides. We
are not aware of any similar study. Our analyses provide impor-
tant insights into the practical deployments of such a pervasive
and fundamental technology as WPA2 and strongly suggest that a
requirement fundamental for enjoying the security guarantees of
WPA2 Enterprise is not satisfied in a very large amount of deploy-
ments.
We hope that our results will help in disseminating awareness of
the risks associated with insecure configuration ofWPA2 Enterprise
supplicants and in promoting more secure usage and configuration
practices.We also hope that our results will be taken into account by
the WiFi Alliance for defining the new family of wireless protocols
WPA3.
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